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10 Intra-party democracy 
A revisionist perspective from 
below 
He Baogang 
The Chinese Communist Party (the CCP) is a gigantic body, the largest 
political party in the world with a membership of 66 million, out of which 
there are about 45 million rank-and-file members. It is a puzzling polit-
ical phenomenon, which repeatedly surprises many commentators. After 
the events of 1989 it was predicted that the CCP would collapse in three 
years. When this did not happen the prediction was revised to nine years, 
but this too proved to be wrong. The Party not only survived but it also 
expanded its power by establishing Party branches in newly established 
residential buildings 1 and privately owned factories. At the national level, 
the politburo and central party organization controls 42 giant corporations. 
In the 1980s the overriding political reform principle was the separation 
of the Party from government.2 Today, however, the Party controls all 
governmental organizations. Local Party secretaries tend to hold concur-
rently the post of chairperson of the local People's Congress. No doubt, 
the Party is enjoying increasingly more absolute power, but this growth in 
absolute power is accompanied by another puzzling phenomenon, in that 
there has been a marked improvement in China's place on Transparency 
International's index of corruption.3 It seems paradoxical that an increase 
in the absolute power of the Party should be accompanied by a decline in 
the level of corruption. One possible explanation for this apparent paradox 
is an enhanced level of local and intra-party democracy. 
China has experienced several mini-waves of local democratization. The 
first wave was the introduction of village elections in the 1980s and the 
institutionalization of competitive elections in the 1990s.4 The second wave 
saw open nominations and elections for township heads in the 1990s.5 
Urban participatory and deliberative institutions can be seen as the third 
wave,6 while the fourth wave is characterized by the introduction of intra-
party democracy. 
Just as price reform was the key for Chinese economic reforms, so intra-
party democracy is the most significant part of political reform. In the 16th 
Party Congress, one major issue was to improve and reform the Party's 
leadership and rules of governance.7 On the agenda was the improvement 
of existing election and monitoring institutions and the protection and 
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expansion of the right of Party members to access information, and partic-
ipate in political processes. It was regarded as essential to make the Party 
more democratic, and make Party democracy more concrete, truthful and 
meaningful. 
Serious reservations about the soundness of intra-party democracy are 
often raised, the most significant of which is the question of how a Leninist 
party can contribute to the democratization of itself. There seems little 
hope for the achievement of intra-party democracy in Beijing. Neverthe-
less, there are significant differences between the top and bottom organ-
izations of the CCP and, horizontally, divisions exist among party 
organizations. Internal regime change from below is a source of democ-
ratic transition. From below there is a progressive force to promote internal 
party democracy, push the limits of change, and generate innovative solu-
tions. There are comparative precedents in that the Communist Party in 
Hungary did introduce intra-party democracy, and the South African 
Communist Party managed to transform itself into a democratic party, 
while the Swedish Social Democracy Party (Svenska arbetarepartiet) 
which ruled Sweden in the 1930s-70s, revitalized itself to regain political 
power from 1990s up to now. 
The aim of this chapter is to develop a revisionist view of the CCP through 
a study of the discourse of intra-party democracy, grass-root changes in 
villages, the capitalist components of the Party, the changing nature of Party 
representation in practice, and the experiment of the Pennanent System of 
Party Representatives (PSPR). It calls for a new thinking about the unthink-
able - about the prospect of intra-party democracy - urging us to reflect 
upon and criticize our own liberal presuppositions about the CCP. 
The chapter focuses on the experiment of intra-party democracy in 
Ya' An and Jiaojiang cities. It draws on my extensive fieldwork and inter-
views in Beijing, Shanghai and Hanzhou in 2002; Ya' An and Wuhan in 
2003; and Beijing, Hangzhou, Wenlin and Jiaojiang in 2004. Of course, 
Ya' An and Jiaojiang don't reflect the national trend, and there are regional 
variations and differences. Indeed, the democratic wave flattens in some 
areas, but continues to swell in other areas. 
It should be noted that some experiments in intra-party democracy escape 
the attention of the media or of Western scholars. This is because main-
taining a low public profile is a characteristic of China's political experi-
ments in developing intra-party democracy. It has not adopted the traditional 
May Fourth way of intellectual debates and advocacy. Instead, these polit-
ical experiments have been carried out with very little or no debate in the 
public forum. 
The advocacy of intra-party democracy 
The CCP has undergone an interesting and surprising shift from the sepa-
ration discourse of the 1980s to the unity discourse, advocating that all 
194 He Baogang 
key political organizations should be unified under the Party's leadership 
in the 1990s. Despite the fact that the Party seems more comprehensively 
in command since the 1990s, however, the idea of intra-party democracy 
has nevertheless gained ground. This situation is not as surprising as it 
may first appear. In fact, it is to be expected, because it can be seen as 
a partial response to the increasingly absolute power of the Party. It can 
be seen as a balance mechanism of the political machine, and a critical 
component of the mixed regime. 
Intra-party democracy is seen as enhancing political rights - an institu-
tion whereby all Party members can participate in Party affairs directly or 
indirectly on an equal basis. All Party members are equal, and enjoy the 
rights protected by the Party constitution. In parallel with village level 
reforms, it is now advocated that the Party secretary and other members 
in the same Party committee should be equal and that the principle of one 
member, one vote should be implemented in intra-party elections. 
It has been advocated and was experimentally implemented in some places 
that multiple-candidate elections replace single-candidate elections for Party 
Congress delegates. In some places such as Ya' An a multiple-candidate elec-
tion for Party secretary at the township level and above will be carried out. 
It is further suggested that the General Party Secretary should be elected by 
the Central Committee or even by the Party Congress, which, in tum, should 
become the most important body in determining crucial issues. 
It is proposed that in order to create checks and balances within the 
Party, its power should be divided among Party committees, executive 
committees, and Party discipline inspection commissions, with each being 
independently responsible to Party Congresses.8 Essential to intra-party 
democracy is the idea of three divisions of power within the Party. Liao 
Gailong was the early campaigner for this idea, and Professor Wang 
Guixiong from the Central Party School endorsed and advocated it. 
According to the proposal, legislative power lies in the Party Representative 
Congress; executive power is created by converting the general Party 
committee into an executive agency; and the judicial power belongs to the 
Party disciplinary committee and the monitoring committee from the Party 
Representative Congress. It is argued that the system is a unifying force 
that is able to keep the different power divisions under the Party leadership, 
and the source of all power· comes from the Party Congress. 
There is a zigzag route toward Western style democracy in the proposal 
for three divisions of power. The Chinese official ideology has been 
opposed to the three divisions of power as a Western institution that does 
not apply to China. To get around this ideological obstacle Chinese int~l­
lectuals advocated three divisions of power within the government in Sheng 
Zhen in 2002, then within the Party in 2003. This seems to be a Chinese 
path toward the three divisions of power. Whether this can be seen as an 
ideological breakthrough remains to be seen, as in 2004 when the Party 
ordered that this issue should not be discussed. 
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Chinese understanding of internal party democracy shares with inter-
national advocates of intra-party democracy in stressing the principles of 
participation and inclusiveness, accountability and transparency, and repre-
sentation. The Chinese idea of intra-party democracy, however, does not 
emphasize gender equality, fair primary elections that produce a party-list 
of candidates, or democratic control of Party funding. Moreover, Chinese 
intra-party democracy is not based on factions within the Party. (Of course, 
others advocate plural factions within the party and suggest that the CCP 
should learn from the LDP in Japan where party pluralism contains one 
party plus factions, or parties within the Party.) It is not oriented toward 
individual liberty, rather than toward collective solidarity. It maintains one-
party rule rather than seeking to create a multi-party system. It wants the 
rule of law but under the leadership of the CCP. It aims to improve the 
Party's congress system, not to adopt referenda or general elections. It 
stresses the importance of a checking and monitoring role for journalists 
rather than absolute freedom of the press. These aspects of intra-party 
democracy are contrary to a liberal understanding of party, but consistent 
with the Chinese collective concept of the Party (see Table 10.1). 
From the above conceptual comparison three things are clear. Patently 
the CCP is not a "normar' party in the liberal definition of party, and the 
concept of party in China is different from that of liberalism. Additionally, 
Chinese internal party democracy is quite different from that of liberal 
democracy.9 If we apply a liberal framework then it is clear that a full and 
genuine Chinese democracy cannot coexist with the domination of the CCP. 
As Bruce Dickson argues, "if the country [China) does become democra-
tic, it will be essentially at the expense of the CCp."lD If, however, we take 
these different conceptions seriously it is possible for us to entertain the 
Chinese idea of intra-party democracy. If we follow a Chinese conception 
of the Party and internal party democracy, we will appreciate and validate 
the possibility of plural paths towards democracy including a Chinese way. 
If we adopt a process perspective, the Party has a crucial role to play in 
obstructing or, alternatively, promoting Chinese democratization. 
To understand any new development of the Party and the idea of intra-
party democracy, it is important for us to question whether our thinking 
and assumptions about the party in general are problematic in under-
standing China's Party. In particular, we should question whether a liberal 
theory of party illustrated by Sartori is applicable to China. To understand 
the CCP, it is best to begin with its concept of the party and to find out 
whether there is conceptual innovation. 
People's Party at village level? 
Village elections have increased the CCP's confidence in democratic tran-
sition and developed a non-zeTo-sum game. Initially, the CCP was greatly 
concerned at the prospect of declining Party influence in village elections. 
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Table 10.1 Comparing two concepts of party 
Sartori's liberal concept of party 
Individualism is the foundation of 
party. Individuals form parties to 
advance their private individual 
interests. 
The origin of the modem party 
system has developed from "parts" 
(section of society) to party. Party is 
"part," not "whole"; no single party 
can claim "the whole," therefore a 
multiple party system is needed. 
Chinese understanding of party 
At a normative level, Party (Dang) is a 
collective concept excluding private interest. 
Party is for the promotion of collective and 
public interests such as community and 
nation-state beyond private ones. 
The Party is, or represents, the whole, the 
CCP represents all peoples in China and is 
equivalent to Chinese nation. Party = state 
= government = people. The concept of 
party does not contain the idea that part 
becomes a party. 
Because party is "part" or "faction" Because the Party is, and represents, the 
on an individual basis, factions within whole on a collective basis, factions within 
a party are allowed to articulate the 
interests of different parts. 
Multiple parties compete for political 
power through elections. This is a 
link between party and democracy. 
Disagreement produces a modem 
party; dissent is a virtue of party 
politics. 
Plural parties are able to establish 
and maintain one polity through 
constitution and consensus. 
the Party are denied in tenns of moral 
principles, unity and solidarity. In real party 
life, factions do exist but the Party 
suppresses them. 
CCP monopolizes political power in the 
name of providing national security, unity 
and social control. This is a link between 
one-party domination and denial of liberal 
democracy. 
Dissent is an enemy of the Party; and 
discipline is a key to maintaining the unity 
of the Party. 
The Party believes that plural parties will 
lead to disintegration. 
It controlled the whole process, speed and direction of elections. After 
some experiments, the Party was able to co-opt non-party members and 
minimize the cost of village elections. It discovered that elected village 
committee members or chiefs are capable of maintaining local order even 
though some of them are non-party members. It also found that electoral 
contests for the position of village Party secretary are highly effective in 
renewing the Party's power in rural society. 
As a consequence the village Party secretary is increasingly elected by 
villagers. The new rich, including private entrepreneurs, are recruited into 
the Party; the village Party organization is regularly monitored by the 
village representative assembly; the Party secretary has to share power 
with elected village committee heads and the VRA, which is increasingly 
becoming a final decision-making institution. All of these new develop-
ments signal a significant change in the CCP's ruling principles and 
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institutions. Its source and operation of power have changed and are 
evolving in a democratic direction. 
In 2001-2, many localities adopted Party elections in Zhejiang. In Linhai, 
anyone who failed to get more than 50 percent of the villagers' votes could 
not be the candidate for the village Party secretary. In 2002, the Party 
mandated that all who want to be village Party secretaries must first 
stand for election to the village committee. 11 It seems that the Party has 
discovered party elections as a new solution that "may [reconcile] the 
requirements of village self-government and the survival of the Party."12 
The sequence of elections is an interesting issue. The common practice 
has been to let the election of village Party secretaries precede the elec-
tion of the village committee. Now in the Shanxi model, the village election 
precedes the Party election, and in the Guangdong model, those who are 
elected as village chiefs automatically become Party secretaries in a joint 
election. Such a practice embodies the democratic principle of allowing 
the populace to have the final say. More importantly, Party elections 
raise an interesting question. If villagers are involved in electing Party 
secretaries, to what degree, in the long term, will the Party branch change 
into a genuine "people's party?" At the risk of some exaggeration, the 
CCP appears to already have developed into two parties: a villagers' party 
where diverse interests are represented and negotiated and where political 
power is shared and checked; and a national party where social interests 
are not properly represented, and which still monopolizes and refuses to 
share power. 
Capitalist component within the Party 
The growth of private economy, private ownership, and rural and urban 
industrialization, all pose challenges to the Party. As a response, the criteria 
to join the CCP have changed and the CCP has admitted capitalists and 
private entrepreneurs into the Party. In the past, class background and class 
consciousness were the main criteria. Today, these are no longer crucial. 
One township Party secretary suggested three requirements necessary for 
Party admission: to take the lead in becoming rich; to carry out [the Party's] 
policy (i.e., to obey Party discipline and the law), and to be young with a 
good educational background. 13 A millionaire who ran a private enterprise 
hiring large numbers of workers was admitted into the Party. 
According to the Almanac afPrivate Economy in China 2000, 4.3 million 
or 19.8 percent of private entrepreneurs were Party members in 1999.14 In 
one township in 1996, 20 percent of village Party secretaries were private 
entrepreneurs; and in four districts in Shanghai in 1998, 13 percent of the 
private entrepreneurs were Party members. I5 
The percentage of private entrepreneurs in Party membership goes up 
in scholarly surveys. Forty percent of all responding entrepreneurs were 
Party members in Bruce Dickson's survey of 500 private entrepreneurs in 
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1997 and 1999. 16 Strikingly, the result of David Goodman's interviews 
with 239 leading business people in Shanxi Province during 1996-8 shows 
that 77 percent of rural entrepreneurs, 56 private entrepreneurs, 73 joint 
venture managers, 66 private enterprise managers were CCP members. 17 
Many members of the new class have been invited to join the Party, or 
to become deputies of local People's Congresses through elections. By 
1995, at the national level, 5,401 private entrepreneurs had become deputies 
of People's Congresses at and above the county level; 8,558 were 
committee members of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference; 
1,357 were committee members of the Communist Youth League; and 
1,430 were committee members of the Women's Federation. In Shimen 
County in Hunan Province, for example, 198 private entrepreneurs have 
become local leaders; among them, 86 are village leaders, and 67 are the 
secretaries of village Party organizations. 18 In Baodin, 94 percent of private 
entrepreneurs joined various social organizations. Eighty-two percent of 
the entrepreneurs who owned more than one million yuan were elected 
deputies of People's Congresses at and above the county level, or were 
committee members of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference. 19 
With wealth and money private entrepreneurs attempt to buy political 
power, while at the same time political power holders want to get rich 
through regulation and control of license. The combination of wealth and 
power inevitably leads to intricate corruption. In order to combat corrup-
tion, many advocate democratic mechanisms. Simultaneously entrepre-
neurs began to demand more free space and greater social liberalization 
which are in keeping with their interests.2o They no longer willingly 
accepted conditions imposed on them; instead, they wanted a share in 
decision-making and the formulation of policies related to their interests. 
They consider election to be a way to have a say in the Party decision-
making process. 
It should be noted that these private entrepreneurs participate in local 
politics merely as individuals or as interest groups, not as a politically 
mobilized "class" in the political sense as in the European context. This is 
because any class-based political mobilization and campaigning is prohib-
ited by the party-state, which clamps down on anything that is perceived 
as attempting to stir up class conflicts. 
Three represents 
All round the world political parties are losing linkage with society and 
the issue of true representation is a serious problem. The CCP is not excep-
tional, but it has worked hard to address the representation issue. The 
discourse of "three represents" aims to achieve maximal inclusiveness and 
representation. 
In February 2000 in Guangdong, Jiang Zemin proposed the concept of 
"three represents" (san ge dai biao), that is, the CCP represents the "most 
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advanced mode of production, the most advanced culture, and the inter-
ests of the majority of the popUlation." Jiang Zemin seems to realize that 
the CCP has to reposition itself to be representative of the whole nation 
instead of just being the vanguard of the working class. One township 
Party secretary commented that the best way of transforming the CCP is 
through the new private entrepreneur class, and that this is the essence of 
Jiang Zemin's three represents.21 
Given that the new private entrepreneur class forms a large part of "the 
most advanced mode of production," Jiang Zemin proposed that the Party 
should recruit more members from this new class. The proposal was 
adopted in the 16th Party Congress marking a significant change in the 
nature of the CCP, and radically transforming it from being representative 
of the working class and peasants to being representative of all social classes 
including the new entrepreneur class. Now in Ya' An, the Party branch in 
each village is required to recruit between two and five private entrepre-
neurs into the Party each year. At the same time, the Party branch is obliged 
to help Party members to be rich through supporting his/her business. 
It should be noted that while the concept of three represents aims to 
further increase the percentage of the private entrepreneur class in the Party 
so as to enlarge the social basis of the CCP, it cannot be understood as 
only the representation of the new rich class. Jiang's emphasis on the 
CCP's representation of the interests of the majority of the population can 
be seen as an attempt to rebuild the Party as a "national party" (minzu 
dang). This seems to return to Song Ping's earlier call in 1990 for nation-
alizing the CCP into an "all-people party" (quanmin dang).22 There is an 
internal contradiction, however, between the interests of people such as 
workers and the interests of the rich. It is precisely this contradiction that 
justifies the Party's intervention and its role of coordination in dealing with 
the conflict of interests. 
Whose interests does the party-state represent? 
The emergence of the new private entrepreneur class raises the question 
of the nature of the party-state. With more and more officials entering 
systematic alliances with business figures, selling political access as a 
commodity and enriching both themselves and their business cronies, the 
question of economics invading politics inevitably arises. Local officials 
of the party-state have become more dependent on the new private entre-
preneurs than on the workers. Some local officials have been known to 
borrow money from private entrepreneurs to pay their workers who work 
in the unprofitable state-owned enterprises. Others rely on the business of 
private entrepreneurs to solve the problem of unemployment. 
Will the noble idea of "a government for the people" be narrowed down 
to one of "a government for the rich"? Does the party-state now represent 
the interests of capital, or is Party membership merely used as an instrument 
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to develop capital? There are signs to suggest that subtle changes are 
already taking shape in the relations between the party-state, the new 
private entrepreneur class and the working class. Bao Tong, who was the 
personal advisor to the former Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang, asserted, "it 
[the three representative doctrine] implies that it is now time for the party 
to admit the unspoken truth and formally declare that it has become China's 
party for the rich and the powerful. "23 
Can the party-state maintain its neutrality and make policies that go 
beyond class relations? The central leadership of the party-state seems to 
adopt a neutral position, in conflicts involving workers and entrepreneurs. 
The central government has restricted the inclusion of the new private 
entrepreneur class into national politics on the one hand, and suppressed 
underground labor movements on the other. Also, the party-state has seem-
ingly attempted to protect the interest of workers through the introduction 
of several laws. The 1992 Trade Union Law requires that waged laborers 
be given the right to form or join unions, and to participate in democratic 
management and supervision. Further, the 1994 Labor Law guarantees 
minimum wages and restricts overtime work. Fully implementing these 
laws, however, can be very difficult. For example, when 62 state-owned 
or collective enterprises were sold to private business people in Ninghai 
county of Zhejiang Province, all its trade unions were closed down or 
simply lost their function.24 
Permanent system of Party's representatives 
Together with the three represents discourse and the changing nature of 
the party-state's representation is a slow and quite institutional change, 
the formation of the PSPR. The PSPR was originally proposed by Deng 
Xiaoping in 1956. In the 13th Party Congress, Zhao Ziyang's team 
proposed that a PSPR be established. Gao Fang raised the issue in an inner 
circle group. In 1988, the central Party organization approved 12 experi-
mental sites for this: among them were Jiaojiang and Shaoxing. Before the 
16th Party Congress, seven out of twelve sites stopped their experiments. 
The system was improved in Ya'An, however, in August 2002. In 2003, 
more experiments were carried out in 17 cities of Meishan and Zhlgong 
in Sichuang; in the Baoan district of Sheng Zhen, Huizhou city, Yang dong 
county in Guangzhou, Chengbei district in Nanning city, and Yichang city. 
In the past, Party Congress was held every five years, and Party repre-
sentatives elect Party committee members who, in tum, elect Party secre-
taries. Now Party Congress will be held every year. In Ya' An, Party 
representatives hold quarterly meetings each year. In the past, the Party 
Representative Congress was a consulting body, but now it is deemed as 
a decision-making institution and the source of final authority.25 
In the past, Party election was only a formality. However, in Yinjin 
county, Ya' An city, Party representatives were competitively elected in . 
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2003. Among the 5,800 Party members, 736 (that is 12.7 percent of Party 
membership) participated in running for election, 241 were decided as final 
candidates and 166 were elected as Party representatives in August 2003. 
During the election process, 17 Party leaders at township level lost their 
positions. 
In the PSPR, Party representatives are permanent positions for the period 
of the Party Congress. They are "permanent" in the sense that Party repre-
sentatives exercise their daily rights and powers. Party representatives are 
granted five basic rights - the right to election; the right to discuss major 
policies; the right to evaluate Party leaders; the right to monitor; and the 
right to propose a motion. Ten or 20 permanent Party representatives can 
put forward a motion in the Party Congress. The relevant Party or govern-
ment organization must answer an inquiry made by any permanent Party 
representative within three to six months. Moreover, in exercising these 
rights, Party representatives are protected by state laws and the Party disci-
plinary committee. The Party secretaries have no right to arbitrarily remove 
Party representatives. 
Several initiatives were taken so that a Party Representative Congress 
can be held more frequently and more efficiently. The size of the constitu-
ency of Party representatives was reduced so that one representative is able 
to make close contact with, and represent, about 100 Party members; the 
standing committee and the alternate member system were abolished to 
make the Party Representative Congress a decision-making body. Ya'An 
has also set up a new institution for Party representatives called the "Party 
representative liaison office." 
Significant is the initiative of democratic evaluation within the Party. In 
2003 in Va' An city, in an annual Party Congress, all major leaders were 
evaluated by Party representatives, 40 percent of whom had to be ordinary 
members. Crucially, if any leader does not gain a confidence vote of over 
70 percent, a dismissal process will begin automatically against him/her. 
In practice, a first no-confidence vote will result in such a leader being 
given a warning and one year to improve their work. Dismissal only occurs 
after a second non-confidence vote. There are several limits to this eval-
uation. In Jiaojiang city, Zhejiang, the Party organization stopped the 
evaluation practice in 1991 because the Party secretary lost face when he 
received far fewer confidence votes than his colleagues. Nevertheless, it 
reintroduced the evaluation in 2003. In Zhejiang, the Party secretary Zhang 
Dejiang did not endorse the idea of citizen evaluation, and did not approve 
the proposal for the evaluation of all major leaders by citizens. Only deputy 
leaders of governmental departments were allowed to be evaluated by 
21 leaders in 2002-3. 
There are, however, some problems with the PSPR. First, this is a bureau-
cratic expansion of the Party, illustrated by the fact that five staff members 
for a representative office were added in Va' An. Additionally, there is 
a representatives' monitoring committee that checks the disciplinary 
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committee. Second, there is uncertainty about the relationship between the 
Party Representative Congress and the People's Congress. In taking over 
the role of People's Congress, the Party Representative Congress will be 
held first, followed by the People's Congress which is supposed to endorse 
the decisions made by the Party Representative Congress. 
Limits 
Obviously there are very many limitations to intra-party democracy as 
discussed above. Here I would like to say more about these limitations. 
Most new experiments took place at township or county level. Very little 
progress has been made at the central level. The changes are minimal, 
marginal and deceptive in the sense that they aim to delay rapid democ-
ratization. As Gang Lin points out, "Beijing's major goal is to perpetuate 
the CCP's ruling legitimacy by developing intra-party democracy."26 
Intra-party democracy does not represent a radical departure. Its inherent 
limitations include continuing Party domination, limited roles for active 
civil society, a failure to fully protect civic rights, and a lack of trans-
parency and openness. An external mechanism to monitor Party elections 
is absent. If internal democracy is not open to outside scrutiny, how can 
it push societal democracy, or encourage pluralism and competition among 
parties? 
The whole problem is that the CCP still controls state power. Intra-party 
democracy is under the control of the Party organization, in particular, the 
Party's "four submissions" discipline. Intra-party democracy can be seen 
as a revised form of democratic centralism. Jiaojiang city made little 
process when the Party Representative system challenged the exiting power 
structure. 
Even if there is democracy, it is elite democracy, exclusive to people 
and other parties. It is not liberal or social democracy, nor is it the consti-
tutional reform that China urgently needs. Without pressure from society 
and NGOs, internal party democracy is limited. The limits of intra-party 
democracy can be seen in Table 10.2. . 
There are external and internal constraints on internal party democracy. 
Primary elections create division and factions within the Party, and exces-
sive intra-party democracy is seen to weaken the discipline and solidarity 
Table 10.2 The limit of one-party democracy in a comparative context 
One-party democracy 
Election by party 
members 
Party monopoly 
Two-party democracy 
Elections decide ruling 
party 
Power turnover between 
two parties 
Three-party democracy 
More choices 
The third party alternative 
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that are required to compete for power and votes. From the perspective 
of the CCP, therefore, internal party democracy must be limited, to such 
a degree that it will not weaken the Party. There is a trade-off between 
discipline (competitiveness) and democracy. 
Normally, state democracy precedes party democracy. It is thought that 
it is only after a country consolidates state democracy that intra-party 
democracy becomes an issue. This is because freedom and democratiza-
tion in civil society encourages and allows ordinary Party members to 
challenge Party leaders. Given the lack of state democracy in China, it is 
thought doubtful that China can develop a meaningful party democracy. 
As Gang Lin points out, "in the absence of meaningful restraints on the 
Party's monopoly of power and the consequent blurring of lines between 
Party and state authority, China's institutional building is likely to be 
incomplete and fraught with theoretical inconsistency and strategic ambi-
guity."27 It is commonly asked whether it is possible for China to achieve 
internal party democracy before it achieves state democratization but this 
sequential thinking is mistaken. It is mistaken to say that there is no need 
for state democracy if the CCP has internal party democracy. In reality, 
local Party officials emphasize the interactive relationship and mutual 
influence between party democracy and people's democracy. 
Thinking on the unthinkable 
The changes discussed above require a revisionist view of the Party. Without 
revision, our expectations will meet unpredictable outcomes, and our pre-
dictions of the demise of the CCP will fail again. Western liberals should 
have the courage to adapt their principles to the Chinese reality. Western 
liberal presuppositions about the Party prevent us from looking objectively 
at the Chinese path toward local democracy, the liberal political paradigm 
distracts us from paying sufficient attention to the mixed regime that 
China has developed, and the focus on democratization strategies for civil 
society handicaps our enquiries into other paths toward democracy. 
One special issue of The Journal of Democracy was devoted to the ques-
tion of whether the Party is able to renew itself or whether it is likely to 
suffer further decay.2s Critics such as Qinglian He hold the view that the 
CCP is morally and politically so corrupt and bankrupt that it cannot renew 
itself, let alone undertake the democratization of China.29 Nevertheless, 
beyond a simple dichotomy between renewal and decay, one needs to ask 
deeper questions and think the unthinkable. 
Viewing the Party with a fresh eye 
The Party is still Leninist in the sense that "Leninist organizational princi-
ples prohibit the formation of competing organizations that could challenge 
the CCP, and the Party enforces this prohibition strictly."30 Beyond that, 
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however, the Leninist framework is inappropriate to fully apprehend the 
significant developments at the local level and is unable to help us under-
stand the complex reality of party politics in China. 
The conventional view in the West is that the presence of the Party con-
stitutes an obstacle to Chinese democracy, and that the CCP is expected to 
collapse as did its counterpart in the USSR. In reality, however, the ideol-
ogy of communism is gone, the Party ideology has been "secularized" from 
a principle-oriented party to a utilitarian party. That the CCP does not have 
a strong commitment to "ism" means that it is flexible enough to make 
substantial change for its survival. Indeed, the membership of the Party is 
changing in favor of the rich, the unchallenged domination of the Party 
has been weakened, and the Party has gradually learnt to share power 
with elected village committees and representative assemblies, while 
increasingly adopting elections as an institutionalized measure to reinforce 
its legitimacy. 
We have to ask whether the Nomenklatura appointment system3l has 
changed at local level. Now, the local party organization appoints cadres 
outside the Party, open nomination and elections play some roles in appoint-
ing local cadres, and the local party, in particular, village Party secretaries, 
have to share powers with elected village chiefs. In these ways, the power 
of the Party's organization has been slightly reduced and restricted, the 
sources of local power are being redefined and elections and deliberation 
are increasingly becoming a new source of authority and legitimacy. 
The CCP has undergone a transition from an overwhelmingly peasant-
based Party to one that attempts to represent all sectors of society, and 
from opposition to private ownership to support for privatization and the 
capitalist line. The CCP has recruited entrepreneurs and the new rich. The 
CCP has also transformed itself from a revolutionary party to a conserv-
ative ruling party as was proposed in 1991 by Tai zi dang.32 The move 
towards a conservative ruling party has been taken as follows: to abandon 
the communist goals and to adopt new nationalist and patriotic goals; to 
restore the traditional Chinese culture to discipline the masses and to unite 
all the Chinese people; to give up radicalism and political romanticism and 
to emphasize gradualism and realism. 
In urban cities, local parties at the level of residential committee some-
times function like charity organizations; the local party boss develops a 
charity plan and persuades local business people to help the poor. During 
traditional Chinese festival periods, the poorest people may receive up to 
2,000 yuan. Urban residential communities also provide welfare services 
by registering the jobless and poor and helping them to find jobs. 
The idea that the Party is a rational actor helps us to understand its choice 
of seeking to foster intra-party democracy under certain circumstances. In 
the long term, if these developments continue, the Party's principles will be 
redefined and its nature changed, so that these elements will eventually open 
a path for a quiet and peaceful change in the Chinese authoritarian system. 
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Creating a Chinese model of democratization? 
China's path toward democracy must be unique in human history not only 
because of the size of China's population and its long history of civiliza-
tion, but also because of the Chinese experience of economic reform. China 
has experienced mpre than 20 years of economic reforms and has devel-
oped its own pattern and model. Due to the success of these economic 
reforms, the Chinese are becoming more confident in creating their own 
model, and they do not want to simply copy models such as the KMT in 
Taiwan, the PAP in Singapore and the LDP in Japan. 
Will the CCP adopt a multi-party system? This seems to be a misleading 
and unproductive question in the current situation; instead it is better for 
us to fully understand the historical and conceptual restrictions on the 
development of a multi-party system in China. An historical perspective 
on the multi-party system is very enlightening. In the latter Qing, there 
was strong opposition to the formation of the Party because according to 
Confucian ethics, the Western style of party was regarded as a group of 
people who pursue private interests (pengdang). Gradually, the notion of 
party was accepted and China witnessed a variety of political parties. 
Despite the existence of plural parties, one party tended to regard itself as 
the only legitimate one and did not respect other parties.33 In the end, the 
CCP monopolized all power and controlled state, society and the army. 
Despite the separation discourse, since the 1990s the CCP now firmly holds 
to the unity discourse that all key political organizations should be unified 
under the Party's leadership. Clearly, all these historical events demon-
strate continuation of the Chinese tradition of so-called "Great Unity." The 
centralization of power through one party has been regarded as an effec-
tive way to maintain national unity. The holistic concept of party as a 
whole was entrenched in the Chinese mindset and political institutions. 
This is a significant historical constraint on the development of a multi-
party system in China. 
Another constraint on the development of a multi-party system in China 
is cognitive. It is really difficult for China to break the holistic tradition 
to endorse an individualistic concept of the party. In the history of well-
developed democracies, different parties represent the different interests of 
social classes, which constitute a basis for a multi-party system. Of course, 
in the post-modem society, class representation has been weakened in the 
politics of party. In China, the CCP claims it represents the advanced 
culture, the advanced classes, and the whole people. Its representation is 
beyond the division of social classes. The idea of the party does not contain 
the idea of representing diverse interests through a plural party system (see 
Table 10.1). It is unlikely that China will replicate a European model of 
multi-parties backed by conflicting social classes. The CCP deals with class 
conflicts through the means of technocracy - capitalists sharing power with 
technocrats - and three represents. At the same time the Party adopts tough 
measures to suppress any political group that aims to mobilize social 
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classes. In addition, the Chinese idea of party does not imply sharing power 
and the turnover of power between two parties. It can claim its legitimacy 
as long as it maintains control. It justifies one-party domination in terms 
of economic growth, that is, one-party domination provides the stability 
and the environment that rapid economic development needs. 
Given the above cognitive and historical conditions, one might think 
a realistic and productive question about a Chinese form of a multi-party 
system. It is important to ask whether the current one party plus multi-party 
cooperation system34 will develop into a functional equivalent of a multi-
party system. In the system of one-party domination and multi-party coop-
eration, the CCP shares its power with other democratic parties in a limited 
way. Political consultation with democratic parties is made before making 
a decision, democratic parties are informed before announcing major deci-
sions, -the support from democratic parties is garnered after announcing 
major decisions and some deputy posts are allocated to democratic party 
leaders. It seems that the CCP is the head of the coalition with other parties. 
China is developing a mixed regime in which different ingredients such 
as the traditional Mandarin rule, one-party domination, the form of people's 
party, functional factions representing different interest groups, and demo-
cratic elections and monitoring are combined. The idea of the mixed regime 
provides a better framework for exploring new developments and exam-
ining the potential of intra-party democracy.35 Through mixing these 
ingredients, China is in the process of creating its own model of political 
rule and democratization in the twenty-first century. It will be interesting 
to see whether the three divisions of power within the Party is the first 
step towards three divisions of power in the state. 
At the same time, China is attempting to combat the real and potential 
corruption of absolute power in a one party-dominated system through the 
introduction and development of intra-party democracy.36 Nowadays, it is 
extremely difficult for local officials to commit serious corruption. There 
are several checks against any potential evil-doer. The Party discipline 
committee has more power than before; and the Party secretary no longer 
controls the same level's Party discipline committee. The monitoring com-
mittee comprising permanent Party representatives constitutes another 
important check mechanism.37 There are two important institutional 
safeguards against corruption - the annual Party democratic evaluation 
meetings in which any Party leader who does not gain above 70 percent 
of evaluative votes will face internal Party disciplinary warning and punish-
ment, and Party elections where officials are likely to lose their position 
in the internal party election if they have a bad name for corrupt ·behavior. 
Concluding remarks 
While I concur with many of the criticisms of intra-party democracy, I 
would like to stress that intra-party democracy is a much more important 
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and significant institutional development than that of village or township 
elections. Just imagine that 66 million Party members, five percent of 
China's population, will go to vote for their Party representatives! If the 
proposal of intra-party democracy were realized, the Party itself would 
change into something new, the current nature of the CCP would be 
sacrificed, and the CCP would become more powerful but also more legit-
imate. Even if a majority of Chinese people would still be deprived of 
democratic processes, intra-party democracy would, nevertheless, still 
constitute a big step. Intra-party democracy will improve the quality of 
one-party domination and prevent it from becoming an absolutely corrupt 
and tyrannical party. 
The end result of intra-party democracy might be the legitimization of 
factions within the party, like that of the LDP in Japan, and the creation 
of two or more functional "parties" within the CCP. It might also lead to 
a fundamental change in the state-party relationship. If the Party were 
democratized, the state would have been democratized too because of the 
nature of the Chinese party-state. It would also pave the way for a rapid 
transformation to state democracy and strengthen reformers within the 
Party. From intra-party democracy, one may look to the prospect of inter-
party democracy, and the democratization of the relationship between 
the Party and the state. While the CCP cannot afford to miss this histor-
ical opportunity, Western observers and China watchers need to think of 
all the possibilities for the future of the CCP. 
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